Summary of
Compliance
A Report from the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement

June 19, 2013

The following report summarizes my first compliance reports as Monitor under the National Mortgage
Settlement, which I have filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It
includes:
• An overview of the process through which my colleagues and I have reviewed the servicers’ work.
• Summaries of each servicer’s results and scorecards regarding their compliance for the first and
second test periods (the third and fourth calendar quarters of 2012), as well as initial disclosure
from testing conducted during the third test period (the first calendar quarter of 2013).
• Information about consequences set forth in the Settlement for servicers after a potential violation
is reported or discovered.
• An analysis of complaints received from consumers and during meetings with distressed
borrowers and the professionals who represent them.
• A discussion of additional testing measures I am exploring.
• An update on my work to complete the consumer relief reports.
Because the servicing standards on which the metrics being tested are based were phased in during 2012,
testing for the periods covered by my compliance reports did not include all the metrics established by the
Settlement. All of the metrics have been tested, however, through the first calendar quarter of 2013 and
will be covered by future reports to the Court and the public.
As more fully discussed in this summary report, there were three metric fails in 2012 and five metric fails
in the first quarter of 2013, confirming much of what I have heard during the last year from state attorneys
general, housing counselors, advocates and distressed borrowers. The Settlement requires that the
servicers create and implement corrective action plans and institute remediation efforts, all of which my
professionals and I are currently overseeing.
While it is still early in the compliance monitoring process, it is clear to me the Settlement has allowed
us to uncover issues with the servicers’ activities that need to be rectified. My job is to hold the servicers
accountable to the commitments they made under the Settlement. I intend to continue to do just that.
I hope that the compliance reports just filed with the Court
will inform the public and policymakers, and I look forward
to engaging in a conversation about the findings outlined
in the following pages.
Sincerely,

Joseph A. Smith, Jr. Monitor
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Introduction
As required by the National Mortgage Settlement (Settlement or NMS), I have filed
compliance reports with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for each servicer that is a party to the Settlement. These reports provide the results
of my findings regarding their compliance with the servicing standards established
by the NMS. This document summarizes these reports, which cover the third and
fourth calendar quarters of 2012, or test periods one and two. These reports are the
first public step in a monitoring process that will continue for the next several years.
Copies of the reports filed with the Court are available on my website:
www.mortgageoversight.com.
I have long believed that the servicing standards are the most important and lasting component of the NMS. Improving
the way servicers work with their customers is an important part of reforming home mortgage finance to better balance
efficiency and fairness. While I hope these reports will contribute to the national conversation around the servicers’
compliance with the Settlement, it is important to remember that they cover only the first two test periods. Subsequent
reports will provide additional detail.

Testing Process
To test compliance with the 304 servicing standards,
I have worked closely with a team of professionals. Last
year, I hired BDO Consulting, a division of BDO USA, LLP
(BDO) to serve as my primary professional firm (PPF).
I chose BDO due to its substantial financial services
industry expertise, capacity and lack of meaningful
conflicts with any of the servicers I am monitoring.
To assist in the review of servicer performance, I
retained five secondary professional firms (SPFs) and
have assigned one to each servicer. These firms also
strike an appropriate balance between capability and
independence.

Who Monitors Whom?

Metrics
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To assess how well the servicers adhere to the 304 servicing
standards, or rules, outlined in the NMS, the servicers and the
professionals in my employ and I use a series of 29 metrics, or
tests. Each of the servicers and I negotiated a separate work plan
that specifies how the tests are carried out and validated. The
Monitoring Committee, comprised of representatives from 15 states,
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development,
and the United States Department of Justice, reviewed these work
plans and, after providing input, did not object to their adoption.

Metric Testing Timeline

Each servicer has assigned a group of employees who are
independent from the servicer’s mortgage loan servicing operations
to ensure the servicer’s activities are compliant. This group of
employees, called the Internal Review Group (IRG), uses the
servicer’s system of record to compile the full population of loans
related to each metric and then tests a statistically valid sample
to determine whether the servicer has passed the metric. The SPF
assigned to the servicer then reviews the work papers of the IRG
and retests a sub-sample of the IRG’s test sample in a process
overseen by the PPF and me.
Each servicer implemented the servicing standards according to
a unique schedule. As a result, different servicers were ready for
testing on different metrics at different times. During test periods
one and two, servicers were not tested on all 29 metrics. Some
metrics were tested for some servicers and not tested for others.
If a metric was not tested by a servicer in test period one or two, it
was tested for the first time in test period three (the first calendar
quarter of 2013) and will be the subject of upcoming reports.

Testing a Metric

If a servicer’s IRG reports that it failed a metric, the NMS deems this
a potential violation that the servicer can cure. The servicer must
create and implement a corrective action plan (CAP) to address
the root cause of the fail. I review and, once satisfied, approve the
CAP. Additionally, the servicer compensates borrowers identified
during the testing who were harmed by the potential violation.
If the potential violation is widespread, remediation must cover
all borrowers who were harmed dating back to the servicer’s
implementation of the relevant servicing standard or standards.
The SPF, PPF, and I then regularly review and test the
implementation of these remediation plans until the servicer asserts,
and I confirm, that its remediation is complete.
Though the review process is summarized for purposes of this
document, it is, in fact, extensive and exhaustive. The work
conducted to test the five servicers during the first two periods
involved 195 professionals including my PPF, SPFs, and other
professionals who dedicated approximately 37,900 hours over a
six-month period.
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Servicer Performance
Bank of America, N.A.

J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

During the two test periods covered in this report (July 1-Sept.
30, 2012 and Oct. 1-Dec. 31, 2012), Bank of America, N.A. (Bank
of America) was tested on a total of 12 metrics. These include
metrics related to providing borrowers with a single point of contact,
completing a foreclosure sale in error, assessing fees in error,
affidavit integrity, complaint response timeliness, and accuracy of
loan modification denials, among others (for more information, see
Metric Testing Timeline).

My team and I tested J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) on
11 metrics through the end of the first two test periods, including
metrics related to affidavit integrity, providing borrowers with a
single point of contact, complaint response timeliness, and forceplaced insurance termination, among others (for more information,
see Metric Testing Timeline).

Bank of America was not tested on 17 metrics during the first
two test periods because of the timing of its servicing standards
implementation that related to the metrics. Bank of America did not
fail any of the 12 metrics tested during the first two test periods.
By the end of test period three, as is the case for all the servicers,
Bank of America had been tested on all the metrics. Bank of
America has recently disclosed to the Monitoring Committee and
me that it failed Metrics 6 and 19 in the third test period. Metric 6
requires accurate information in a letter the servicers are required
by the Settlement to send to borrowers before starting foreclosure,
and Metric 19 measures whether the servicer is complying with
the requirement to notify the borrower of any missing documents
in the borrower’s loan modification application within five days of
receipt. Bank of America has begun work on proposed CAPs for
these potential violations. I have not yet verified their findings or
conducted my own testing, and will report on these matters in my
next compliance report to the Court and the public.

Bank of America scorecard

During its IRG review, Chase disclosed to the Monitoring
Committee and me a potential violation of Metric 29, which tests
whether the servicer terminates force-placed insurance coverage
within 15 days of receipt of evidence of existing coverage. Chase
prepared, and I approved, a CAP. Chase has voluntarily remediated
all affected borrowers under that plan for a period commencing
in April 2012. Chase reported that it has provided remediation by
refunding premiums to over 2,000 borrowers. This amounts to
more remediation than the NMS requires for a widespread error.
Chase has completed its CAP and has resumed testing Metric 29.
My PPF, SPF, and I will review such testing and Chase’s remediation
activities and provide our determination as to each of these
activities in my next compliance report.
Additionally, Chase has disclosed to the Monitoring Committee
and me that it failed Metric 20 during the third test period. Metric
20 measures whether the servicer follows the timelines for making
a decision on a borrower’s loan modification application and
for notifying the customer of its denial decision. I am currently
reviewing Chase’s proposed Metric 20 CAP, including a review of
the need for remediation. Information on these activities also will
be publicly available in my next report.

Chase scorecard
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CitiMortgage, Inc.

ResCap Parties (formerly Ally/GMAC)

CitiMortgage, Inc. (Citi) was tested on 15 metrics through the
end of the second test period. These include metrics related to
incorrect denial of a loan modification, affidavit integrity, proof of
claim, appropriateness of fees, work force management, providing
borrowers with a single point of contact, compliance with the loan
modification decision/notification timelines, and force-placed
insurance notification and termination, among others (for more
information, see Metric Testing Timeline).

The ResCap Parties (formerly Ally/GMAC) have been tested on 11
metrics through the end of the second test period. (See the Metrics
Testing Timeline.) To date, neither the IRG nor my professionals
have found evidence of a failed metric.

Citi reported to the Monitoring Committee and me a potential
violation of Metric 19 during test period two. Metric 19 tests
whether the servicer is complying with the timeliness requirement
to notify the borrower of any missing documents in the borrower’s
loan modification application. Citi is currently implementing a CAP
and, because I determined the error to be widespread, is working
with my professionals and me to ensure that any borrower harmed
by this potential violation is appropriately compensated.
Citi has disclosed to the Monitoring Committee and me that it
failed two additional metrics during the third test period. These
include Metric 6, which requires accurate information in a letter
the servicers are required by the Settlement to send to borrowers
before starting foreclosure, and Metric 23, which measures the
requirement to notify borrowers about missing documents within
30 days of a request for a short sale. Citi has submitted to me
proposed CAPs for both metrics, and I am now reviewing them.
In my next public report, after I have done the necessary work, I
will provide additional information regarding my review of Citi’s
compliance activities and Citi’s CAPs.

Citi scorecard

The ResCap Parties were subject to a Feb. 5, 2013 bankruptcy court
order that split up and transferred their servicing rights and assets
to Ocwen Financial Corporation (Ocwen), Green Tree Servicing
(Green Tree), and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Berkshire). Ocwen
acquired approximately 80 percent of the servicing rights and
assets, Green Tree 18.5 percent, and Berkshire 1.5 percent. I have
met with representatives from Ocwen on multiple occasions, and
testing will continue on course. I will make publicly available the
results of these reviews in my next reports. I have had exchanges
with Green Tree and will negotiate an implementation schedule
for its compliance with the servicing standards, which will dictate
when testing resumes for its portion of the ResCap Parties’ portfolio.
Representatives from Berkshire and I have yet to determine how it
will participate in the NMS.

ResCap scorecard

Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight

6

Wells Fargo & Company

Wells Fargo scorecard

Wells Fargo & Company (Wells Fargo) was tested on
a total of 20 metrics through the end of the second
test period (see the Metrics Testing Timeline).
In test period two, Wells Fargo reported to the
Monitoring Committee and me a potential violation
of Metric 19, which measures compliance with the
requirement to notify the borrower of any missing
documents in the borrower’s loan modification
application within five days. Wells Fargo is
implementing a CAP, and I will report on Wells
Fargo’s performance on Metric 19 and other metrics
in my next compliance reports to the Court.

Consequences of a
Potential Violation

What happens when they fail?

As explained in the above summaries of each
servicer’s performance, failing a metric requires
the servicer to develop a plan to correct its related
practices. The CAP must address the root causes
of the failure and must be approved by me. While
a servicer is implementing a CAP, my PPF and the
assigned SPF communicate with the servicer to
monitor progress and identify any issues. Once the
servicer asserts that it has integrated the measures
outlined in the CAP, the PPF and assigned SPF
review their work. A servicer’s CAP is not complete
until confirmed by me. If it is completed in the
first month of a quarter, testing recommences
that quarter. Otherwise, testing begins again the
next quarter. In addition to the CAP, if the failure
is determined to be widespread, the servicer must
remediate, or compensate for, any material harm to
its customers.
If the servicer fails the same metric again, within
either of the first two quarters after completion
of the CAP, the Monitoring Committee and I may
take enforcement action through the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. This may
include injunctive relief and civil penalties up to $1
million or, in certain circumstances, $5 million.
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Consumer Complaints

Executive Office Complaints

In addition to the testing activities described above, I have
had regular meetings with state attorneys general, housing
counselors, advocates, and distressed borrowers. As a
result of these meetings I am certain that more work needs
to be done to improve the way the servicers are treating
their customers.
The NMS requires that each servicer submit to me
Executive Office complaints, or complaints that are filed
with the servicers by the offices of elected officials on
behalf of their constituents. Between October 1, 2012 and
March 31, 2013, my professionals and I had received and
analyzed 59,586 Executive Office complaints from the five
servicers. The most frequent Executive Office complaints
are related to single points of contact, dual tracking, the
loan modification process, and accuracy of customers’
account information.
My colleagues and I also receive complaints directly
from state attorneys general offices and have access to
complaints submitted to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB). We compare these complaints to those I
receive from the servicers to make sure my colleagues and
I are benefiting from all relevant complaints.

Professionals’ Complaints

Additionally, we review the complaints submitted through
my website by professionals who work on borrowers’
behalf, which provide an independent source of information
to supplement the other sources. Between May 10, 2012
and May 10, 2013, professionals had submitted 797
complaints through my website. Their most frequent
complaints include issues with the loan modification
process, single points of contact, and dual tracking.
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Additional Testing

Consumer Relief

Based on what I have learned over the last year, I have concluded
that while servicing practices have improved in some respects,
there remain areas of concern. These areas include issues with
the loan modification process, customer service, including the
single point of contact, and billing and statement inaccuracies.

The PPF is working diligently to confirm the crediting of
consumer relief that the servicers have claimed through the end
of 2012. It is my expectation that I will submit additional Monitor
Reports on consumer relief to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia within the next six weeks.

The NMS gives me, after consulting with the servicers and the
Monitoring Committee, the authority to impose discretionary
metrics, in addition to the 29 laid out in the Settlement. I am
currently at work with the servicers and Monitoring Committee
to use this authority to address concerns I have heard around the
country and through my review of consumer complaints. I look
forward to reporting our progress on this important work.

Additionally, I secured the servicers’ agreement to sit individually
for an interview with my PPF and me. During these interviews,
servicers respond to a series of questions about consumer relief
requirements that are not part of the crediting process. These
questions cover the servicers’ obligations with regard to certain
geographies, protected classes of borrowers, mandatory second
lien extinguishments, and avoidance of double-counting of
governmental incentive payments, among other matters. I intend
to comment on these additional requirements in my upcoming
Monitor Reports concerning consumer relief.

Conclusion
The Monitor Reports that I have just filed with the Court show that
the Settlement is having the intended effect of uncovering problems
with servicer performance. The potential violations revealed by this
process are consistent with what I have been hearing from consumers,
state attorneys general, advocates, and housing counselors around
the country. CAPs, including remediation when required, have been
implemented or are in process. If the CAPs are not successful, the
Monitoring Committee and I will take additional action, as dictated by
the Settlement.
It is clear to me that the servicers have additional work to do both in their efforts to fully comply with
the NMS and to regain their customers’ trust. There continue to be issues with the loan modification
process, single point of contact, and customer records. To that end, I am working on additional metrics
to better address the issues that a year’s experience has revealed. I will make those metrics publicly
available as soon as they are finalized.
I continue to believe that the NMS is a valuable and effective contribution to an improved system of
residential mortgage finance. The problems it addresses are large and complex; improvement will take
time. This report and those that follow will inform policymakers and the public in a way that I hope will
support confidence in this process and understanding of how the home mortgage finance system can,
and should, evolve.
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